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Syndicated Loan Market
Jan Keil and Karsten Müller*
Abstract
How do changes in banking regulation affect the syndicated loan market? Because branch
networks and loan syndication both enable banks to diversify geographical credit risk,
we investigate the staggered implementation of the Riegle–Neal Interstate Branching and
Banking Efficiency Act of 1994. Exploiting that the act only changed the legal frame-
work for out-of-state commercial banks, we find that branching deregulation decreased
syndicated loan issuance but spurred bilateral lending to corporations. Consistent with a
supply-driven substitution effect, this shift is also reflected in interest rate spreads. Our
results suggest that changes to banking regulation can substantially alter credit allocation
across loan types.
I. Introduction
The market for syndicated loans is the most important source of corporate
financing in the United States.1 As a result, syndicated loans have been at the cen-
ter of a large and active body of research.2 However, there is surprisingly little
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1With USD 2 trillion in annual issuance, it accounts for a larger volume than corporate bonds
issued by domestic companies; half of all commercial and industrial (C&I) loans in the United
States are underwritten by a syndicate (see https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/global-
syndicated-loans-league-tables-fy-2016/, https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/e2/current/default
.htm, and Ivashina (2009), Lee, Liu, and Stebunovs (2017)).
2For important contributions on syndicated loans see, among others, Sufi (2007), Ivashina (2009),
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli (2011), Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and
Xuan (2012), Ferreira and Matos (2012), Lim, Minton, and Weisbach (2014), Chodorow-Reich
(2014), Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2016), Amiram, Beaver, Landsman, and Zhao (2017), and
Cai, Saunders, and Steffen (2017). Many other authors have used syndicated loan market data as the
primary source in their analyses (e.g., De Haas and Van Horen (2012), Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg,
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evidence on how the sweeping changes to banking regulations over the past
decades have affected the market. In this article, we take one step toward clos-
ing this gap and investigate the impact of the Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA) on the pricing and issuance of
syndicated loans.
Syndicated loan contracts are originated, structured, and managed by lead
banks, which usually screen and monitor borrowers. Apart from collecting fees,
one of the primary motivations for lead banks to syndicate loans is to diversify
credit risk (Simons (1993), Preece and Mullineaux (1996), and Gadanecz (2004)).
Syndication, however, comes at a cost: Coordination among multiple creditors
is fraught with asymmetric information and moral-hazard problems (Pennacchi
(1988), Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Ivashina (2009), and Sufi (2007)) and
becomes particularly complex during renegotiations (Gertner and Scharfstein
(1991), Preece and Mullineaux (1996), and Bris and Welch (2005)). As a result,
lenders face a trade-off between the advantage of risk diversification and higher
coordination costs vis-à-vis other syndicate members. An alternative for a lead
bank to diversify its loan portfolio is to rely on direct lending via a branching
network (Demsetz (2000), Deng and Elyasiani (2008), and Goetz, Laeven, and
Levine (2013), (2016)).
The IBBEA lifted restrictions on commercial banks to permit them to branch
freely across state borders and thus facilitated geographical diversification by al-
lowing more direct access to borrowers (Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996),
Demsetz (2000), Calomiris (2000), and Akhigbe and Whyte (2003)). The ef-
fect on banking markets was transformative. Out-of-state banks formed extensive,
consolidated branching networks, which increased their market share from only
2.5% in 1994 to 45.8% in 2011. Research on lender–borrower distance suggests
that the resulting reduction of physical proximity enabled banks to screen and
monitor borrowers more effectively (Petersen and Rajan (2002), Degryse and On-
gena (2005), Hauswald and Marquez (2006), Hollander and Verriest (2016), and
D’Acunto, Liu, Pflueger, and Weber (2017)) and without the coordination costs
from syndication. We hypothesize that the IBBEA thus changed the incentives of
commercial banks to originate syndicated compared with bilateral loans to diver-
sify credit risk.
Consistent with this intuition, we find that the issuance of syndicated loans
decreased at both the bank and state levels after branching deregulation, whereas
bilateral lending increased. The overall lending impact of the IBBEA appears to
have been positive, albeit small in percentage terms, consistent with Rice and
Strahan (2010). Our results thus point to a shifting of debt contract types from
syndicated to bilateral loans. We also show that the effects of the IBBEA at
the state level crucially depend on banking-sector concentration prior to the re-
form (see also Black and Strahan (2002), Cetorelli and Strahan (2006)). States
with little competition before deregulation, where branching networks expanded
and Weisbach (2013), Dougal, Engelberg, Parsons, and Van Wesep (2015), Ivashina, Scharfstein, and
Stein (2015), Kalemli-Ozcan, Kamil, and Villegas-Sanchez (2016), Falato and Liang (2016), Saidi and
Neuhann (2018), and Müller (2019).
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most after the restrictions were lifted, saw the largest effect for both direct and
syndicated lending.
To refine our identification strategy, we exploit cross-sectional variation
in loan characteristics. The resulting triple-difference setup generates loan-level
variation, which allows us to absorb unobserved time-varying borrower and bank
characteristics using borrower× year and bank× year fixed effects. Because bor-
rowers frequently issue multiple individual facilities in the same year (40% in our
estimation sample), the data give us ample variation. The benefit of this approach
is that we can rule out alternative explanations based on unobserved borrower risk
or credit demand.
We find that the IBBEA had a differential effect on debt pricing: Interest
rate spreads for bilateral loans decreased by approximately 7% but increased for
syndicated loans by approximately 2%. Although direct loans are more expensive
throughout (see also Angbazo, Mei, and Saunders (1998), Dennis and Mullineaux
(2000), and Ivashina (2005)), they are less so after branching deregulation. Inter-
preted jointly with the effect on lending volumes, these results suggest that ac-
cess to credit improved at the expense of syndicated lending following interstate
branching deregulation. Exploring heterogeneity in borrower attributes, we also
find that smaller, riskier, and more opaque firms experienced a decrease in inter-
est rates. This is consistent with branches lowering monitoring costs by decreasing
the distance between lenders and borrowers (D’Acunto et al. (2017)).
Syndicated loans, however, also differ from bilateral contracts in other as-
pects: they tend to be considerably larger and carry longer maturities, even after
controlling for borrower fundamentals. To rule out alternative explanations, we
make use of the fact that only one group of lead arrangers was subject to the
reform: out-of-state commercial banks. The regulatory change did not alter the
legal framework for other lenders, such as pension funds, hedge funds, invest-
ment banks, or commercial banks with headquarters within a deregulating state
(Johnson and Rice (2008), Favara and Imbs (2015)).3 Importantly, the loans is-
sued by out-of-state commercial banks are not systematically different from those
issued by nonbank lenders or in-state banks. Consistent with our substitution hy-
pothesis, we find that only affected lenders saw increased spreads, even within
the same borrower-year; other loans carried lower interest rates after deregula-
tion, consistent with an increase in lending competition.
We propose a set of tests to support the validity of our empirical approach.
We find that interest rate spreads and loan volumes exhibit a level shift around the
state-level implementation of the IBBEA without preexisting trends or reversals.
Further, we construct a placebo test and find that the sequence of the staggered
deregulation is not correlated with changes in spreads before the reform. We also
provide some evidence that the reform timing is not driven by a state’s syndicated
loan market size or its market concentration. Our results are also robust to a host
of 98 validity checks that let us rule out sample-selection concerns, the influence
3Thrift and other deposit-taking and non-deposit-taking organizations were able to engage in
interstate branching before the IBBEA (Rice and Strahan (2010)). See also http://www.pli.edu/
product files/Titles%2F4655%2F55199 sample02 20141011115534.pdf for a discussion of how
branching regulations affected different financial institutions.
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of single states, joint determination in loan terms, and the tranching of facilities
for nonbank investors.
We build on the insight that banks are relevant even for large, publicly
listed companies with direct access to financial markets (e.g., Dahiya, Saunders,
and Srinivasan (2003), Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2007), Ross
(2010), Chodorow-Reich (2014), and Cai et al. (2017)). For example, lending re-
lationships in the syndicated loan market have been found to affect interest rates
spreads (Schenone (2010), Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011)),
loan terms during financial distress (Li, Lu, and Srinivasan (2019)), corporate
governance (Dass and Massa (2011)), and firm outcomes (Gopalan, Udell, and
Yerramilli (2011)). More broadly, Sufi (2007) finds that proxies for information
asymmetries shape monitoring incentives. In a recent article, D’Acunto et al.
(2017) show that the leverage of publicly listed firms increased with branching
deregulation, which the authors interpret as a shock to monitoring costs. This lit-
erature suggests that the sweeping changes to the U.S. banking system brought
about by the IBBEA may also affect the syndicated loan market.
Our work further contributes to the literature on the influence of geo-
graphical diversification for bank risk (Diamond (1984), Demsetz and Stra-
han (1997), Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2006), and Goetz et al. (2013),
(2016)), physical distance for loan terms and access to credit (Petersen and Ra-
jan (2002), Degryse and Ongena (2005), Hauswald and Marquez (2006), and
Hollander and Verriest (2016)), and the effects of U.S. branching deregulation
(e.g., Stiroh and Strahan (2003), Johnson and Rice (2008), Rice and Strahan
(2010), Chava, Oettl, Subramanian, and Subramanian (2013), and Jiang, Levine,
and Lin (2017)). More broadly, our work is embedded in the literature on financial
deregulation in the United States.4 Banking deregulation has been associated with
higher per capita growth rates (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)), higher loan vol-
umes (Amore, Schneider, and Zaldokas (2013)), lower income inequality (Beck,
Levine, and Levkov (2010)), and many other economic outcomes. Our article is
also related to studies investigating the reallocation effects of financial reforms,
such as those of Chava et al. (2013) and Hombert and Matray (2016), who show
that intrastate branching deregulation decreased innovation by firms with fewer
pledgeable assets.5
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: In Section II, we discuss
why lenders might use syndication to geographically diversify their loan portfo-
lios and how this relates to branching restrictions. Section III presents the data
and variable construction. Section IV introduces the identification strategy and
discusses the results. Section V concludes.
II. Hypothesis Development
The hypothesis we are testing in this article is that allowing interstate branch-
ing decreased the benefits of loan syndication for the out-of-state commercial
banks affected by the IBBEA. To explain the underlying rationale, we review the
4See, for example, Kroszner and Strahan (2014) for an excellent review of the topic.
5See also Boot and Thakor (2000) for evidence on the reallocation effects of increases in
competition.
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institutional details of the IBBEA and discuss how it may have affected the prof-
itability of lead banks engaging in loan syndication. A comprehensive discussion
of loan syndication is beyond the scope of this article; we focus instead on the
mechanisms that were likely influenced by the existence of geographical restric-
tions and their deregulation.6
A. Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994
Congress introduced the IBBEA of 1994 with the intention of removing re-
strictions on interstate branching (i.e., allowing banks to open branches outside
their home states and operate these directly within the central organization of the
bank holding company (BHC)). Interstate branching differs from interstate bank-
ing, where a BHC founds or acquires institutions in other states to operate them
as separately chartered and capitalized subsidiaries. Most restrictions to this latter
form of expansion as well as other geographical limitations within states were
lifted several years before the IBBEA (Berger, Kashyap, Scalise, Gertler, and
Friedman (1995), Jayaratne and Strahan (1998), and Johnson and Rice (2008)).7
In contrast, interstate branching restrictions were almost uniformly in place in
1994, when only Utah allowed unrestricted and unconditional interstate branch-
ing.8 While facilitating the transition toward a liberalized system, the IBBEA al-
lowed individual states to effectively impose anticompetitive obstacles to inter-
state branching. First, states were allowed to set minimum age requirements (up to
5 years) with respect to how long a bank must have been in existence before being
acquired in an interstate merger. This also forced banks to wait until newly estab-
lished subsidiary offices could be consolidated to branches. Second, the IBBEA
preserved the right of states to impose deposit caps of less than 30%. This served
to prevent interstate mergers that would result in banks accounting for a greater
share in insured state deposits than set by the cap (including deposits of affiliated
institutions). In essence, this protected large state banks from takeovers. Third, an
initial entry by a bank through de novo interstate branching was only permitted
if states “opted in” to allow this explicitly. Fourth, states had to opt in to legalize
the acquisition of a single branch or a number of branches (without acquiring the
entire bank itself). Any of these four provisions could be offered by states with
reciprocity.
All these possible restrictions limited the available paths of entry, slowed
down the process, and added significant costs for banks to enter other states’ mar-
kets. Further, individual states lifted these restrictions at different points of time
6Other important motives omitted in the discussion are that syndication allows lead arrangers to
specialize in certain types of lending (Gorton and Pennacchi (1995)) and increase their fee-based
income (Dennis and Mullineaux (2000)).
7All states except Hawaii had entered an interstate banking agreement by 1994, whereas failed
large banks and thrifts or those at risk of failing could be acquired by out-of-state banks nationwide,
irrespective of state laws, since 1982. Intrastate branching was deregulated in all states but one in
1994, and all states relaxed intrastate banking restrictions before 1992 (Jayaratne and Strahan (1998),
Kroszner and Strahan (1999), (2014)).
8Nevada allowed interstate branching for counties with a population of less than 100,000, and
six other states allowed some form of interstate branching on a reciprocal basis. Prior to the IBBEA,
nationally chartered banks in locations close to a state border could also move their main office to a
different state, leaving the former location as a branch (Johnson and Rice (2008)).
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FIGURE 1
Market Share of Out-of-State Banks, 1994 versus 2011
Figure 1 plots the market share of out-of-state banks (those with an ultimate holding company located in another state)
based on deposits in 1994 and 2011. The state-level market shares are the deposit-weighted averages based on county-












and to varying degrees (Johnson and Rice (2008)), a fact we exploit in our iden-
tification strategy. The massive effect on local banking industries is illustrated in
Figure 1: The average deposit market share of out-of-state banks increased from
only 2.5% in 1994 to 45.8% in 2011.
B. Syndicated versus Bilateral Loans
Syndicated loans are partial substitutes for direct bilateral lending through
bank branches (Demsetz (2000)). Syndication has several advantages but also
incurs coordination costs because of adverse selection and moral-hazard prob-
lems, arising from lead banks’ incentive to syndicate risky loans and cut down
on monitoring effort (Pennacchi (1988), Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Holm-
strom and Tirole (1997), Sufi (2007), and Ivashina (2009)). The complexity
and cost of renegotiations are also higher for syndicated contracts with multi-
ple creditors and different claims or interests vis-à-vis a borrower than for bi-
lateral loans (Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), Preece and Mullineaux (1996),
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and Bris and Welch (2005)).9 Accordingly, lenders must balance these syndicate-
specific coordination costs with the benefits of syndication.
Direct lending via a bank’s own branching networks is not associated with
creditor coordination costs (Demsetz (2000)) but involves screening and moni-
toring expenses. In a syndicate, these costs are shared with participants (which
usually pay fees to the lead arranger) and are likely to be lower because syndicate
leaders prefer to minimize their screening and monitoring efforts. Because the
costs of screening and monitoring increase with physical lender–borrower dis-
tance (Petersen and Rajan (2002), Degryse and Ongena (2005), Hauswald and
Marquez (2006), Hollander and Verriest (2016)), the creation of branches in dis-
tant states can be interpreted as a negative shock to these costs (D’Acunto et al.
(2017)). This likely increased the profitability of bilateral relative to syndicated
loans.
Risk diversification is one of the main reasons commercial banks syndicate
loans (Simons (1993), Preece and Mullineaux (1996), and Sufi (2007)). Lead
banks can share loan exposure with other lenders, which may reduce exposure
to idiosyncratic local shocks and enhance stability (Diamond (1984), Boyd and
Prescott (1986), Demsetz and Strahan (1997), and Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan
(1999)).10 In a regulatory regime that inhibits (direct) geographical diversification
and closely ties the fortunes of banks to their local economies (Calomiris (2006)),
syndication helps overcome limitations and reduces exposure to geographical
and local industry shocks (Simons (1993), Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), and
Gadanecz (2004)). Others have argued that direct lending via a broad branching
network is an alternative way to diversify a loan portfolio (Demsetz (2000), Deng
and Elyasiani (2008), and Goetz et al. (2013), (2016)) and that banks took ad-
vantage of this newly available alternative following the IBBEA (Hughes et al.
(1996), Calomiris (2000), and Akhigbe and Whyte (2003)).
Loan syndication is also a way for lead banks to reduce “concentration
risk” and meet related regulatory rules (Berger and Udell (1993), Simons (1993),
Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), and Gadanecz (2004)). For example, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) requires banks to limit the loan size to a
single borrower to 15% of its capital and reserves (25% if fully secured by readily
marketable collateral).11 To comply with regulatory requirements and reduce
exposure to large individual borrowers, lead banks may prefer to share credit risk
exposures with other lenders instead of holding them entirely on their own balance
sheet (Pennacchi (1988), Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), and Simons (1993)).
Syndicated lending especially allows smaller banks to lend to large borrowers
they could not otherwise serve without “overlining” regulatory limits. Large bor-
rowers, however, have considerably lower default rates and more “prestige” from
which banks may benefit (Muermann, Rauter, and Scheuch (2017)). The dramatic
9A recent example of an analysis of creditor coordination costs in the context of covenant-light
contracts is Becker and Ivashina (2016). Hart and Moore (1995), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), and
Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006) focus on creditor coordination more broadly.
10In line with this, Deng and Elyasiani (2008) find a premium for U.S. banks diversifying nation-
ally, and Goetz et al. (2013, 2016) find that geographic expansion reduces bank risk.
11See https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/8000-7400.html. Syndication can also help
meet minimum capital requirements (Simons (1993)).
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increase in bank size following interstate branching deregulation (median deposits
were $74 million in 1994 and $137 million in 2011 in real terms) likely eroded this
advantage of syndication by allowing the typical bank to underwrite considerably
larger (bilateral) loans entirely on its own.12
Access to large or distant borrowers through syndication further enables
lenders to cross-sell other services (Gadanecz (2004)). The revenue from these
sales might have cross-subsidized spreads on syndicated loans prior to deregula-
tion (Gaspar, Massimo, and Matos (2006), Lepetit, Nys, Rous, and Tarazi (2008)),
which may partially explain the discount compared to bilateral loans (Angbazo
et al. (1998), Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), and Ivashina (2005)). The newly
gained ability to directly access potential customers after deregulation may re-
duce the willingness to continue offering the previously “subsidized” rates on
syndicated loans.
Overall, it appears reasonable to expect that more extensive branching net-
works post-deregulation induced banks to partially substitute syndicated for bilat-
eral loans. Empirically, we would expect less syndicated loan issuance, a larger
supply of bilateral loans, and a lower interest rate discount for syndicated loans.
In particular, one would expect a decrease in the spreads of bilateral contracts,
consistent with an increase in credit supply (and previous evidence in Rice and
Strahan (2010) and D’Acunto et al. (2017)). The impact of IBBEA implementa-
tion should also be entirely driven by the lenders that were legally affected by the
IBBEA, namely, out-of-state commercial banks (Johnson and Rice (2008), Favara
and Imbs (2015)). We put these empirical predictions to the test in Section IV.
III. Data
A. Data Sources
The main data sources are detailed loan information from the Thomson
Reuters LPC DealScan database matched with firm-level data from the Standard
& Poor’s (S&P) Compustat North American Annual Fundamentals file. We use
the Compustat Ratings package and Mergent’s Fixed Income Securities Database
(FISD) to obtain information on firm ratings. As is standard in the literature, we
exclude financial firms (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 6000–6999), reg-
ulated utilities (SIC 4900–4999), and public administration (SIC>9000). We also
drop all non-U.S. firms and firm-years with negative assets.
We matched the DealScan files to the firm-level data using the DealScan–
Compustat link file from Chava and Roberts (2008). We start our estimation sam-
ple in 1987 to establish a reasonable pre-reform control group before the passage
of the IBBEA in 1994. In our main estimations, we restrict the sample to the
period up to and including 2007 to abstract from the impact of the financial cri-
sis, which may have had a differential impact across states depending on their
12In an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in 2008, the chief executive offi-
cer (CEO) of Commerzbank explained the rationale as follows: “If a multinational corporation
requested a e10 billion loan for an acquisition in the past, you would have to form a syndi-
cate for that. Today, a single large bank can lend such an amount and keep the entire profit for
itself” (http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/unternehmen/commerzbank-chef-mueller-im-interview-
wir-haben-uns-in-der-krise-gut-behauptet-1548096-p2.html).
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liberalization policies. We show in Section IV.F that our results are robust to ex-
tending the sample period until 2012 (the end of the Chava–Roberts link file).
We capture the intensity of branching deregulation using the time-varying
index of Rice and Strahan (2010). They set the index to 0 for states with no re-
strictions and add 1 for each type of restriction imposed, with the index ranging
from 0 to 4.13 The index is matched to our DealScan–Compustat data set using
Compustat’s location data (variable state) and the exact date branch restrictions
were lifted.14 We use this variation to create a dummy variable if a state lifted
at least one restriction, as in D’Acunto et al. (2017), Chava et al. (2013), and
Koetter, Kolari, and Spierdijk (2012). The resulting “treatment” dummy is 1 for
all state–years in which the index is equal to 1 or larger, and 0 otherwise, indi-
cating that out-of-state state banks are allowed to erect or acquire local branches.
We later show that our results are robust to using the (reversed) continuous index
from Rice and Strahan (2010).
We use data from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits to measure a state’s
existing market concentration prior to the passage of the IBBEA in 1994.15 More
specifically, we calculate a county’s Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) based
on the deposits held by each bank and then aggregate this to the state level by
weighting by a county’s total deposits. We also draw on FDIC data to identify
whether a bank had a branch presence in a state prior to deregulation. These data
are only available from 1994.
B. Variable Construction
The unit of observation in the first part of our study is a loan contract facility,
where multiple facilities may be included in a deal package. The main depen-
dent variable is a loan’s all-drawn interest rate spread (usually over the London
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)).
To isolate the effect of branching deregulation on spreads, we hold the con-
tract term loan size and maturity (in natural logarithms) constant in the baseline
regressions and include a dummy for whether a loan uses collateral. All regres-
sions include dummy variables for whether a firm has ever received a loan from
the lead arranger bank to control for an existing lender–borrower relationship, as
well as for whether a facility is a term loan. We also control for differences across
loan purposes by including a full set of 22 dummy variables.16
13Following Rice and Strahan (2010) and Favara and Imbs (2015), we set the index to “fully
restricted” (0) before 1994 where we have no further information, assuming that states were fully
restricted before the passage of the IBBEA. This is a reasonable approximation given the evidence
on limited de facto cross-border branching activity presented earlier. Note that although the original
index ends in 2005, we let it run until 2007 as in D’Acunto et al. (2017) because no state reversed its
liberalization decision.
14For each facility, we know the exact issuance date and use this to merge loans with deregulation
dates. All results presented here are robust to assigning the index based on the year of implementation.
These results are available from the authors.
15Alaska is the only state that lifted a branching restriction in the year of the reform in 1994.
16Because we are interested in loans used for normal business transactions, we exclude all loans
whose primary purpose is related to merger and acquisition activities. Such loans are identified as
“Acquis. line,” “LBO,” “MBO,” “Merger,” “SBO,” or “Takeover.” This exclusion, however, does not
drive our results.
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In our triple-difference estimations, we use cross-sectional exposure at the
facility level. First, we look at syndicated loans, which we define as facilities with
a distribution method other than “sole lender.” Second, we use a dummy equal to
1 when the lender is a commercial bank (identified as lenders with an SIC 3-digit
code of 602). For both exposure variables, an average of approximately 79% of
loans in the estimated sample are considered “treated.”17 We also condition the
reform impact on whether a bank had a branch presence in the borrower state
prior to IBBEA implementation (“out-of-state bank”). The focus on branches is
motivated by the IBBEA institutional detail, as banks were allowed to operate
local non-consolidated subsidiaries, which in turn may have had branches, even
before IBBEA implementation. Most lead arrangers in the sample, around 62%,
did not have a local presence prior to the reform.
We also control for borrower fundamentals from Compustat, including book
leverage, Tobin’s Q, total assets (in natural logarithm), sales growth, return on
assets (ROA), an indicator for rated firms, and quartiles for borrowers with nega-
tive or very high ratios of debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and
amortization (EBITDA) (Roberts and Sufi (2009), Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009)).
The exact variable definitions can be found in the Supplementary Material, and the
summary statistics are given in Table 1. To minimize the impact of outliers, we ex-
clude firm-years with total asset growth exceeding 200% and winsorize balance-
sheet variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles; Tobin’s Q is further winsorized at
10, as in, for example, Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2005).18 Note that our
sample varies drastically from the Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF) pre-
viously analyzed in the context of the IBBEA (Rice and Strahan (2010)); in the
Supplementary Material, we discuss these differences in more detail.
For the state-level analysis, we aggregate data from DealScan for which we
can identify borrower states in either Compustat or the DealScan company file. In
a few state–years, we cannot identify a single syndicated or bilateral loan and thus
set the aggregate loan issuance variables to 0. We scale total state-level issuance
volumes over gross state product (GSP), which we retrieve from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA).19 We further obtain data on all-transactions house
prices from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and generate annual
growth rates as the percentage change in end-of-year values. Real GSP growth
comes from the BEA.
We also conduct an analysis at the bank–state–year level. Similar to the state-
level aggregates, we calculate the total syndicated and bilateral loan issuance of
a lender in a given state as the total of loan issuance volume.20 We have more
17Note that the relatively high fraction of loans extended by commercial banks is not inconsistent
with the increasing presence of nonbank intermediaries that has been documented in the leveraged
loan market (see, e.g., Nandy and Shao (2010)). The reason the share of commercial banks syndicates
is higher in our sample is because it also includes investment-grade loans.
18The results are not driven by these winsorization choices.
19We adjust for the time-series break caused by the SIC/North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) transition in 1997 by chain-linking the overlapping series. We also winsorize these
ratios at the 0.25 and 99.75 levels to account for a few outliers early in the syndicated loan time series,
when the coverage is somewhat spottier. These adjustments do not drive our results.
20More precisely, we assign loan volumes to lenders based on the DealScan variable
“bankallocation.”
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables we use in the loan-level, bank-level, and state-level regressions.
Data on the 14,102 loan facilities come fromDealScan for the period 1987–2007. We construct lagged firm characteristics
using Compustat Annual Fundamentals North America. Data on loan issuance at the bank–state level is constructed using
DealScan and branch data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). State-level variables are based on
data from DealScan, FDIC, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
The Appendix provides more information on variable construction.
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Std.
Mean Perc. Perc. Perc. Perc. Perc. Dev. N
Interstate Branching Deregulation Index
DEREG 0.639 0 0 1 1 1 0.480 14,102
Loan Characteristics
ln(SPREAD) 5.152 3.912 4.723 5.298 5.704 5.999 0.799 14,102
ln(MATURITY) 3.560 2.398 3.178 3.664 4.094 4.277 0.739 14,102
ln(LOAN_SIZE) 4.349 1.873 3.091 4.527 5.683 6.543 1.818 14,102
SECURED 0.763 0 1 1 1 1 0.425 14,102
RELAT 0.364 0 0 0 1 1 0.481 14,102
TERM_LOAN 0.278 0 0 0 1 1 0.448 14,102
SYN 0.795 0 1 1 1 1 0.403 14,102
COMM_BANK 0.801 0 1 1 1 1 0.399 12,537
OOS_BANK 0.624 0 0 1 1 1 0.484 5,174
Lagged Firm Characteristics
LEV 0.343 0.040 0.170 0.313 0.468 0.635 0.257 14,102
Q 1.425 0.585 0.779 1.073 1.596 2.480 2.210 14,102
ln(ASSETS) 5.947 3.471 4.545 5.927 7.289 8.460 1.921 14,102
ROA 0.113 0.009 0.072 0.118 0.170 0.231 0.135 14,102
DTCF_NEG 0.056 0 0 0 0 0 0.230 14,102
DTCF_HIGH 0.435 0 0 0 1 1 0.496 14,102
SALE_GR 1.023 −0.124 −0.004 0.100 0.278 0.623 34.911 14,102
RAT_DUM 0.398 0 0 0 1 1 0.490 14,102
PPE 0.321 0.067 0.138 0.266 0.459 0.678 0.229 14,102
Pre-Reform Borrower Characteristics
RATING 9.953 6 7 10 12 14 3.398 1,865
PPE 0.343 0.079 0.156 0.296 0.494 0.684 0.230 4,404
ln(ASSETS) 6.332 4.082 5.080 6.197 7.508 8.761 1.816 4,408
Bank-Level Variables
ln(1+SYN_LOAN_VOL) 7.391 0 0 10.243 11.657 12.777 5.503 15,982
ln(1+BIL_LOAN_VOL 0.796 0 0 0 0 0 2.654 15,982
OOS_BANK 0.841 0 1 1 1 1 0.366 15,982
State-Level Variables
SYN_LOAN_VOL_GDP 0.048 0.000 0.005 0.027 0.068 0.119 0.067 1,479
BIL_LOAN_VOL_GDP 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.015 0.010 1,479
HHI_1994 0.199 0.112 0.157 0.201 0.224 0.287 0.064 1,479
HP_GROWTH 0.036 −0.024 0.005 0.037 0.058 0.098 0.056 1,479
GDP_GROWTH 0.025 −0.006 0.009 0.023 0.041 0.059 0.028 1,428
variation in syndicated loans because they are much more common in our sample
than bilateral contracts. In the regressions, we use the natural logarithm of 1 +
issuance volume and adjust for inflation.
IV. Identification Strategy and Results
In this section, we outline our empirical strategy and present our main results.
We also provide an assessment of the validity of our empirical approach.
A. Loan-Level Evidence
To test the effect of the IBBEA on loan contracts, our starting point is the
following difference-in-differences set-up:
ln(SPREAD) f = βDEREGst + γBORROWER CONTROLSi ,t−1(1)
+δCONTRACT CONTROLS f +αi +αt + ε f ,
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where f , s, i , and t denote loan contract facilities, states, borrowers, and years,
respectively. DEREGst is the 1/0 dummy for IBBEA implementation described
previously, which varies by state and date; BORROWER CONTROLSi ,t−1 is the
vector of lagged borrower control variables; and CONTRACT CONTROLS f is
the vector of contract-level controls. To absorb plausible within-correlation caused
by the treatment effect (Petersen (2009)), we cluster standard errors by state.
The coefficient estimate β̂ is supposed to capture the deregulation effect.
The setup in equation (1), however, has the disadvantage that the IBBEA had a
plethora of effects on the financial sector and local economies. This makes it diffi-
cult to pin down a specific channel. To narrow down the substitution effect of the
IBBEA, we thus use a triple-difference strategy. In its most saturated form, this is
similar in spirit to Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina (2014) and Khwaja and
Mian (2008). In particular, we allow for differential treatment impact by interact-
ing the dummy DEREGst with contract details EXP f , which allows us to fully
absorb time-varying borrower × year and bank × year factors with fixed effects,
yielding the following:
ln(SPREAD) f = β1DEREGst +β2DEREGst ×EXP f +β3EXP f(2)
+γBORROWER CONTROLSi ,t−1+ δCONTRACT CONTROLS f
+αi t +αbt + ε f ,
where b stands for banks, which we identify as a loan’s lead arranger, as is stan-
dard in the literature. Using interacted fixed effects αi t and αbt intuitively means
that we compare loans issued by the same borrower in the same year while also
taking out unobserved time-varying bank factors. This is important in our setting
because it rules out that borrower or bank fundamentals unrelated to the loan-level
variation drive our results.
We use different variables for EXP f . First, we use a dummy for syndicated
loans to directly test our substitution hypothesis. Second, we use a dummy vari-
able for loans where the lead arranger is a commercial bank, and thus legally af-
fected by the reform, within the group of syndicated loans. Third, we use a dummy
for out-of-state banks within the group of syndicated loans issued by commercial
banks (also see Favara and Imbs (2015)). We discuss these exposure variables in
more detail momentarily.
The identifying assumption underlying our empirical specification is not that
“exposed” loans are similar in observable or unobservable characteristics to those
that are “not exposed.” Rather, the assumption is that their interest rate spreads
would have trended similarly in the absence of state-level branching deregulation.
This assumption is supported by two pieces of evidence. First, although syndi-
cated and bilateral loans differ in their typical loan terms, there are no consistent
differences between syndicated loans issued by commercial banks versus other
lenders or out-of-state versus in-state commercial banks (see Figure 5). Because
we also exploit variation in lender types within the group of syndicated loans, we
are unlikely to capture a deregulation effect that works through other loan char-
acteristics. Second, and perhaps most important, spreads showed a similar trajec-
tory for “exposed” and “not exposed” loans in the years prior to deregulation, as
we show in the following discussion. That is, they showed no change in spreads
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until after the implementation of the IBBEA. We discuss these and other threats
to identification in more detail in the following discussion and in Section IV.D.
Equipped with our empirical strategy, we begin by running the baseline re-
gression in equation (1), meaning we regress a loan facility’s interest rate spread
on the DEREG dummy and borrower and year fixed effects as well as control
variables. Column 1 in Table 2 plots the results. Recall that the clear majority
of contracts in our sample are syndicated. The estimated coefficient is positive
and highly statistically significant, with a point estimate of 0.054. Because the
dependent variable is measured in natural logarithm, we use the Taylor series ap-
proximation throughout the article to translate log points into percentage changes
to help the interpretation of our findings. An increase in 5.4 log points thus repre-
sents an increase of approximately 5.4% in interest rate spreads, which is equiv-
alent to a small increase of approximately 11 basis points (bps) from the median
spread of 200 bps (see the summary statistics in Table 1).
TABLE 2
The Effect of Deregulation on Syndicated and Bilateral Loan Spreads
Table 2 reports the results of regressing the interest rates spreads of syndicated loans (in natural logarithm) on DEREG,
a dummy that equals 1 if a state has lifted one or more branching restrictions, and 0 otherwise, and interaction variables.
SYN is a dummy for loans with more than one creditor. COMM_BANK is a dummy equal to 1 for commercial banks (i.e.,
lenders with a Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code starting with 602), and 0 for other lenders where industry
classification is available. OOS_BANK refers to banks without branches in the borrower’s state prior to implementation of
the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA). The sample in columns 4 and 5 is restricted to syndicated
loans only, and the sample in columns 6 and 7 is restricted to syndicated loans issued by commercial banks, as indi-
cated by the X. ‘‘–’’ indicates absorbed estimates. See the text for included control variables. Robust standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the state level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Exposure VariableBorrower
FE
(Baseline) SYN COMM_BANK OOS_BANK
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DEREG 0.054** −0.073*** – −0.049 – −0.107 –
(0.025) (0.026) (0.052) (0.068)
DEREG×EXP 0.095*** 0.122* 0.120** 0.248** 0.204*** 0.609***
(0.302) (0.065) (0.051) (0.109) (0.079) (0.180)
EXP −0.139*** −0.087* −0.172*** – −0.126 −0.231
(0.025) (0.052) (0.052) (0.073) (0.229)
Loan controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower controls Yes Yes – Yes – Yes –
Borrower FE Yes Yes – Yes – Yes –
Year FE Yes Yes – Yes – Yes –
Borrower × year FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank × year FE Yes Yes Yes
Only syndicated loans X X X X
Only commercial banks X X
No. of obs. 14,102 14,102 9,703 9,689 6,992 3,148 2,212
Adj. R 2 0.819 0.820 0.951 0.842 0.958 0.886 0.967
We next attempt to strengthen these baseline results by exploiting differential
exposure of borrowers to the reform (as in equation (2)). If our substitution hy-
pothesis is correct, we would expect that interstate branching had markedly differ-
ent effects on syndicated and bilateral loan pricing. We run a direct test in column
2 of Table 2, where we introduce a dummy for whether a loan is syndicated and in-
teract it with the DEREG treatment dummy. The interaction term DEREG×SYN
enters positively with a coefficient of 0.095; it is −0.073 for the deregulation
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measure itself. Both estimates are highly statistically significant. This implies that
interest rates increased almost exclusively on loans with more than a single cred-
itor: The effect on “bilateral loans” was a sizeable 7.3% decrease, whereas syn-
dicated loan spreads increased by 0.095−0.073=2.2%. The loan-level variation
of the treatment effect also allows for the inclusion of a full set of interacted fixed
effects in column 3, where the triple-difference effect increases to 0.122. This
suggests that unobserved time-varying factors at the bank or borrower levels do
not drive our results.
Could it be that other loan characteristics that happen to correlate with syn-
dication drive these results? To get around this issue, we exploit the nature of in-
terstate branching laws to conduct a simple test based on bank types. The IBBEA
only altered restrictions on cross-state branching for commercial banks and did
not apply to other lenders (Johnson and Rice (2008), Favara and Imbs (2015)). We
thus treat commercial banks as “affected” and other lenders as “unaffected” within
the group of syndicated loans. Commercial bank loans in our sample show con-
siderably fewer differences from nonbank loans compared with the syndicated–
bilateral split.21 If we are indeed correct that spreads increased due to a substi-
tution effect between local branches and syndication, only institutions affected
by the changes in regulation should react. Indeed, previous work by Favara and
Imbs (2015) and Rice and Strahan (2010) suggests that the impact on unaffected
lenders should be a reduction in rates due to the increase in competition.
We test this by again running equation (2), this time interacting DEREG
with a dummy for whether a lender is classified as a commercial bank. The result
is reported in column 4 of Table 2. The interaction term now has an estimated
coefficient of 0.120, which is significant at the 5% level. Again, the DEREG
dummy itself now turns negative with a value of −0.049. Although it is im-
precisely estimated, this suggests a decrease in interest rates for loans issued by
lenders other than commercial banks. It is instructive to compare these estimates
with the baseline estimate in column 1. Our estimates suggest that deregulation
increased spreads for affected lenders by 0.120−0.049≈7.1 log points, which
is close to the baseline estimate in column 1. The deregulation-induced increase
in spreads thus appears to be largely driven by directly affected institutions. The
triple-difference specification also lets us absorb demand- or risk-based explana-
tions by including a full vector of borrower × year and bank × year dummies in
column 5. The interaction term DEREG×EXP is again significant at the 5% level
and approximately doubles in size.
Next, we turn to variation within the group of syndicated loans issued by
the affected commercial banks by comparing out-of-state versus in-state banks.
Intuitively, we would expect that banks with a local presence before the reform
were subject to greater competition from out-of-state banks entering the market,
which should drive down interest rates. The increase in spreads we uncover, in
turn, should be driven by out-of-state banks because these were able to acquire
or erect branching networks following IBBEA implementation (Favara and Imbs
(2015)), decreasing the need to use loan syndication to geographically diversify
their loan portfolios.
21We discuss these differences in more detail in Section IV.D.
Keil and Müller 1283
We test these predictions in columns 6 and 7 of Table 2 by interacting our
treatment dummy DEREG with a dummy for out-of-state banks, which we define
as commercial banks without a branch in the borrower state in the pre-reform
year. The approach has the important advantage that all lenders in the sample are,
at some point, out-of-state banks. To illustrate, a bank that is classified as “out-
of-state” in New York will be an “in-state” bank in Utah if it had a local presence
there before the IBBEA. As a result, loans issued by the two types of commercial
banks are observationally equivalent (see Figure 5).
The interacted coefficients for both estimations are positive and highly sta-
tistically significant. Again, the DEREG dummy itself turns negative, suggesting
that, if anything, spreads decreased for lenders with local branch presences prior
to IBBEA implementation. The effect for out-of-state banks, however, was a pos-
itive increase in loan rates of −0.107+0.204=0.097, or 9.7%. This effect be-
comes much larger if we allow for borrower × year and bank × year fixed effects
in column 7 of Table 2, which absorbs all time-varying demand or risk factors.
This result is consistent with a substitution effect of syndicated for bilateral loans
by out-of-state lenders.
A potential concern at this point may be that state-level trends in spreads may
have already been different prior to IBBEA implementation. In technical terms,
this would constitute a violation of the parallel-trends assumption required for
causal inference from difference-in-differences estimates. Such preexisting trends
could be the result, for example, of the process of intrastate branching and inter-
state banking deregulation that had been unfolding starting in the 1970s (see, e.g.,
Kroszner and Strahan (2014)).
Figure 2 investigates this possibility for syndicated versus bilateral loans.
We plot the estimates for the interaction of the syndicated loan dummy with year
dummies around the deregulation date. In particular, we consider 7 years before
and after a state lifted its first branching restriction. The results suggest that there
was no discernible trend in interest rates before interstate deregulation and that the
positive effect we uncovered in Table 2 developed relatively quickly over a few
years after implementation, in line with previous evidence on branching deregu-
lation (e.g., Beck et al. (2010), Chava et al. (2013)).22
We also use a regression framework to test for preexisting trends. Here, we
differentiate between the time periods immediately before and after the reform as
well as long-term effects. Table 3 plots the estimates from this exercise. In column
1, we see that spreads in the period immediately before state deregulation (t−4
to t−1) did not change compared to before: The coefficient of 0.029 is small and
clearly statistically insignificant. Spreads did change, however, immediately after
IBBEA implementation. The coefficients of 0.095 and 0.114 for the periods after
implementation are considerably larger and statistically significant at the 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
22A small lag in the effect should be expected because market entry takes time. Neither identifying
possible new locations for new branches nor acquiring and integrating existing banks can be orga-
nized quickly. In anti-merger antitrust lawsuits, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission usually mention 2 years as the minimum time it takes to enter markets in most industries.
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FIGURE 2
IBBEA Implementation and the Spreads of Syndicated versus Bilateral Loans







βh2DEREGst ×EXPf +β3EXPf + γBORROWER_CONTROLSi ,t−1
+δCONTRACT_CONTROLSf +αi +αb +αt + εf ,
where
∑7
h=−7Dst is a set of dummy variables for the 7 years before to 7 years after the date of Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) implementation. Confidence intervals are based on the 90% significance level, with
standard errors clustered at the state level. We exclude facilities that are most likely structured for institutional investors,
as in column 9 of Table A5 in the Supplementary Material.






























Years Since Branching Deregulation
In columns 2–4 of Table 3, we find a similar pattern for the interaction terms
of DEREG with syndicated loans, affected lenders, and out-of-state commercial
banks. These results are easily summarized by F-tests for the equality of coeffi-
cients between the time periods, reported at the bottom of the table.23 In all re-
gressions, the tests imply that the coefficients for the period of more than 5 years
before IBBEA implementation (DEREG(≤ t−5)) are not statistically different
from those for the period immediately before the reform (DEREG(t−4; t−1)).
This is consistent with the absence of preexisting trends, irrespective of potential
differences in the level of interest rates between loan types. When we test for the
equality of coefficients for the pre- versus post-implementation periods, the null
hypothesis of no difference is strongly rejected, with values for the F-statistic
between 4.5 and 27. Taken together, this suggests the discount on the spreads of
syndicated loans disappeared after branching deregulation but not before.
What do our results imply about the lending conditions of corporations post-
IBBEA? At first glance, it might appear puzzling that the interest rate spreads of
23Note that this test is equivalent to the t-test of statistical significance in column 1 of Table 3. To
aid readability, we thus only report the F-statistic for the interaction terms of interest in columns 2–4.
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TABLE 3
Parallel Trends in Spreads Before Branching Deregulation
Table 3 reports the results from regressions of interest rates spreads (in natural logarithm) on DEREG, a dummy that
equals 1 if a state has lifted one or more branching restrictions. The excluded category is DEREG (≤ t −5). SYN is a
dummy for loans with more than one creditor. COMM_BANK is a dummy equal to 1 for commercial banks (i.e., lenders
with a Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code starting with 602), and 0 for other lenders where industry classification
is available. OOS_BANK refers to banks without branches in the borrower’s state prior to implementation of the Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA). Column 3 limits the sample to syndicated loans, and column 4 limits the
sample to syndicated loans by commercial banks, as indicated by the X. Note that the interaction with COMM_BANK in
column 4 is absorbed by the bank fixed effects (FE). The bottom two columns report the F -statistics for the equality of the
indicated coefficients; insignificant values indicate no difference. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
by states. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Exposure Variable
COMM_ OOS_
Baseline SYN BANK BANK
1 2 3 4
DEREG (≤ t −5) – – – –
DEREG (t −4; t −1) 0.029 0.017 0.085 0.047
(0.023) (0.038) (0.108) (0.083)
DEREG (t ; t +3) 0.095** −0.005 −0.045 0.004
(0.040) (0.048) (0.111) (0.123)
DEREG (≥ t +4) 0.114* −0.105 −0.031 −0.039
(0.061) (0.064) (0.117) (0.128)
DEREG (≤ t −5) × EXP −0.163*** – −0.098
(0.038) (0.088)
DEREG (t −4; t −1) × EXP −0.159*** −0.048 −0.141
(0.031) (0.103) (0.094)
DEREG (t ; t +3) × EXP −0.055* 0.165* 0.028
(0.032) (0.100) (0.040)
DEREG (≥ t +4) × EXP 0.069*** 0.164 0.112***
(0.026) (0.100) (0.042)
Loan controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only syndicated loans X X
Only commercial banks X
No. of obs. 13,437 13,437 9,596 3,134
Adj. R 2 0.848 0.849 0.861 0.895
H0 :DEREG(≤ t −5)×EXP 0.01 0.21 0.28
=DEREG(t −4; t −1)×EXP
H0 :DEREG(
∑




large borrowers with access to capital markets should increase because of changes
to local banking regulations. However, our sample statistics suggest that even af-
ter branching deregulation, syndicated loans still remained considerably cheaper
than bilateral contracts. Consider, by way of example, a typical loan facility in
our sample: a secured revolving loan with a 5-year maturity. The data indicate
that the unconditional average spread on such a contract increased from approx-
imately 180 to 200 bps but decreased from 310 to 300 bps for bilateral loans.
This suggests a decreased discount for syndicated loans, rather than an increase
in borrowing costs per se. The average interest rate increase also reflects the sam-
ple composition: 80% of the loan contracts we observe are syndicated, compared
with approximately 50% of U.S. corporate loans.
Another illustration of the estimated magnitudes is the differences in basis
points after controlling for our baseline controls (as in equation (1)). This exercise
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suggests that spreads increased almost exclusively for syndicated loans issued
by out-of-state commercial banks. Even after controlling for fundamentals, this
increase is sizable: approximately 11 bps for the same borrower. The spreads for
bilateral loans went down throughout, consistent with more competition, as did
those for syndicated loans issued by lenders other than commercial banks. The
only other interest rate increase in the data is for syndicated loans issued by in-
state commercial banks, on the order of 3.5 bps. This is likely explained by the
fact that all banks are an in-state bank somewhere and are thus subject to spillover
effects; competition from out-of-state lenders may have further heightened in-
state banks’ willingness to underwrite loans by themselves, leading to a decline
in syndicated loan supply. Most importantly, the effect on in-state banks is much
smaller than that on out-of-state banks. The increased rates we observe in the data
should thus be interpreted as a reallocation from syndicated to sole lender loans,
rather than an increase in the cost of credit.
Taken together, we find that the effect of branching deregulation increases
with exposure to the reforms. Importantly, our results are fully driven by affected
lenders and syndicated loans, in line with our predictions. If anything, our esti-
mates imply a decrease in spreads for bilateral loans. These findings are consis-
tent with the idea that syndication can be a substitute for direct lending through
local branches to achieve geographical diversification.
B. Bank-Level Regressions
Up to this point, we have focused on the effect of interstate branching on
spreads. In this section, we provide some evidence that banks also reshuffled their
loan portfolios and replaced at least some syndicated with bilateral loans.
More specifically, we run an analysis at the bank–state–year level, which
allows us to absorb a full set of bank × state, bank × year, and state × year
dummies. By way of example, this means comparing borrowers in Alabama in
1999 with other Bank of America customers in 1999, depending on whether the
state was deregulated and the bank exposed to the reform changes. In particular,
our substitution hypothesis implies that out-of-state banks without a local branch
presence prior to the state-level IBBEA reforms used loan syndication to diversify
geographical credit risk. After interstate branching was allowed, these institutions
could enter other state markets and open or acquire branches, which allowed for
the issuance of bilateral loans.
More formally, we regress loan issuance by a given bank in a given state and
year on the DEREG dummy, interacted with a dummy for commercial banks with
a local branch presence prior to the reform (“out-of-state bank” (OOS BANK)):
LOAN VOLbst = β1DEREGst +β2DEREGst ×OOS BANKbs(3)
+β3OOS BANKbs +αbt +αst + εbst ,
where b indexes banks, s states, and t years. LOAN VOL is the natural loga-
rithm of loan-issuance volumes, referring either to syndicated or bilateral loans.24
OOS BANKbs is a dummy for out-of-state banks without a local branch presence
24We assign 0 issuance to all bank–state–year observations between the first and last loan a bank
has in a state for which we do not have any loan data.
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before the reform, which should drive the substitution effect we outlined earlier.
In the most stringent specification, our fixed effects absorb time-varying shocks to
banks and individual states (e.g., to local demand or bank health). Standard errors
are double-clustered at the bank and state level. This clustering choice allows for
error correlations within states (across banks) and within banks (across states).25
The results in Table 4 illustrate that, consistent with our hypothesis, syn-
dicated loan issuance contracted and bilateral volume expanded for banks that
were not present before the deregulation but were able to enter ex post. In col-
umn 1, we show that interstate branching reduced average syndicated loan is-
suance at the bank level. The estimate of −0.299 implies an average decrease in
issuance of approximately 30 log points. Next, we analyze the impact on commer-
cial banks depending on whether they had a local branch presence prior to IBBEA
implementation, implying that they could lend directly to local customers through
their branches. The coefficients in column 2 indicate a large effect on out-of-state
banks: Branching deregulation increased syndicated lending by 69 log points for
in-state banks under competitive pressure but decreased it by 49.1 log points for
out-of-state banks (−1.181+0.690=0.491). The interaction term is still statisti-
cally significant when we include interacted fixed effects in column 3, implying
that it is not driven by changes in demand or aggregate bank-level shocks. This
aligns with previous evidence that lifting restrictions increased credit supply. For
syndicated loans, however, it suggests a contraction for lending by out-of-state
banks, which could lend to local markets via their expanded branching networks
post-IBBEA.
TABLE 4
The Effect of Deregulation on Banks’ Loan Issuance, by State and Year
Table 4 reports the impact of interstate bank branch deregulation on the volume of loans issued by banks in a particular
state and year. DEREG is a dummy that equals 1 if a state has lifted one or more branching restrictions, and 0 otherwise.
OOS_BANK is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has no branch presence in a state prior to implementation of the Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA), and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
by states and banks. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Syndicated Loan Volume Bilateral Loan Volume
1 2 3 4 5 6
DEREG −0.299 0.690* −0.051 −1.159***
(0.333) (0.401) (0.063) (0.296)
DEREG × OOS_BANK −1.181*** −0.598** 0.994*** 0.526
(0.237) (0.239) (0.349) (0.340)
OOS_BANK −1.156*** −1.543*** −1.570*** −1.296***
(0.222) (0.204) (0.370) (0.369)
Bank FE Yes Yes – Yes Yes –
State FE Yes Yes – Yes Yes –
Year FE Yes Yes – Yes Yes –
Bank × year FE Yes Yes
State × year FE Yes Yes
No. of obs. 50,727 13,751 13,462 50,727 13,751 13,462
R 2 0.338 0.307 0.528 0.224 0.221 0.357
To get a more complete picture, we rerun the analysis using bilateral loan
issuance as a dependent variable in columns 4–6 of Table 4. On average, we do
25In unreported results, we find that clustering at the state level makes little difference in the
statistical significance in our setting.
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not find a statistically significant effect in column 4. However, whether banks
had a branching presence prior to a state implementing the IBBEA clearly mat-
ters, as shown by the highly significant coefficients in column 5. In particular, the
coefficient on DEREG itself is negative (−1.159), but it is positive and of simi-
lar magnitude for the interaction with the out-of-state bank dummy (0.994). This
shows that banks reallocated their bilateral loan issuance from states where they
were already present before the IBBEA to newly opened states, where the overall
impact was likely small. In column 6, we replicate this result using a much more
stringent set of fixed effects.
These results are also confirmed by the graphical evidence in Figure 3, where
we allow for a dynamic effect of deregulation around the implementation year.
More precisely, we rerun equation (3) but replace DEREGst with a set of dummy
variables for the years around a state’s IBBEA implementation. On impact, but not
before, out-of-state banks decreased their syndicated loan issuance in deregulated
states and sharply increased their bilateral lending.
Overall, the results presented here increase our confidence in the idea of
a “substitution channel” triggered by syndication becoming a less profitable
way to diversify geographical credit risk, leading banks to a reshuffle their loan
portfolios.
C. State-Level Regressions
The results in the previous sections reveal that interstate branching deregula-
tion was followed by a shift from syndicated to bilateral lending. But were these
effects large enough to matter at the state level as well? In this section, we pro-
vide some evidence based on cross-sectional exposure to the IBBEA induced by
the degree of local market concentration prior to the reform. Although we cannot
rule out that unobserved time-varying state- or bank-level factors partially drive
these results, they are useful for thinking about the aggregate effects of banking
deregulation.
Intuitively, one would expect that the IBBEA had a larger impact on states
with lower initial competition among banks, an insight that Black and Strahan
(2002) and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) find to be true for earlier deregulatory
episodes in the United States. Graph A of Figure 4 shows that the same pat-
tern holds for interstate branching deregulation, where we plot a state’s HHI of
deposits in 1994 (before the IBBEA) against the log-change in the number of
branches after its implementation.26 The data suggest that the branching effect
uncovered by Favara and Imbs (2015) strongly interacts with the pre-reform HHI:
After deregulation, banks opened considerably more branches in states that pre-
viously had more concentrated markets. In the Supplementary Material, we show
that a similar pattern holds for changes to competition post-IBBEA. These corre-
lations also persist in simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions (Table A4
of the Supplementary Material).
26These graphs omit Hawaii and Rhode Island, which are clear outliers. The figures look very
similar when these are included. Because the number of branches is a highly persistent variable, the
results are also not sensitive to the exact time horizon.
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FIGURE 3
Deregulation and Banks’ Loan Issuance, by State and Year
Figure 3 provides graphical evidence for changes in syndicated and bilateral loan issuance around a state’s imple-
mentation of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA). We plot the β̂h2 coefficients of regressions








2DEREGst ×OOS_BANKbs +β3OOS_BANKbs +αs +αb +αt +εbst ,
where h indexes the year relative to deregulation. Graph A plots the results for syndicated loan issuance, and Graph B
plots the results for bilateral loan issuance (both measured as the natural logarithm of 1 + loan volume).
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Graph B. Bilateral Loan Issuance
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Graph A. Syndicated Loan Issuance
Graph B of Figure 4 next plots the evolution of syndicated loan issuance
around IBBEA implementation at the state level. We scale issuance volumes by
state gross domestic product (GDP) and show median values plus 90% confidence
intervals. This reveals a striking pattern. Before deregulation, there was a clear
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FIGURE 4
Pre-Reform HHI, IBBEA Implementation, and Syndicated Loan Issuance
Graph A of Figure 4 plots a state’s deposit Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) in 1994 (deposit-weighted county average)
against the post-deregulation change in the log number of branches (we omit the outliers Hawaii and Rhode Island).
Graph B plots the median and 90% confidence intervals of total state-level syndicated loan issuance in the DealScan
database around the first date a state lifted any of the branching restrictions identified in Rice and Strahan (2010), scaled




























































Graph B. Syndicated Loan–Issuance Volumes/GDP





































Graph A. Change in log(1 + branches), t – 1 to t + 4
Deposit HHI in 1994
upward trend in total syndicated loan issuance. After IBBEA implementation,
however, syndicated lending volume stalled and then decreased as a percentage
of GDP. This is consistent with previous findings of Carey and Nini (2007) and
Gadanecz (2004), who show that the U.S. syndicated loan market contracted after
1997, by which point most states had lifted at least some branching restrictions.
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We use these insights to sharpen the identification strategy first used by Rice
and Strahan (2010) by conditioning the deregulation effect on a state’s market
concentration in 1994 (i.e., before states implemented the reform).27 As we dis-
cuss in Section IV.D, deregulation timing appears to be largely orthogonal to a
state’s pre-reform HHI. This gives us plausibly exogenous variation across states
in the impact of interstate branching deregulation on the syndicated loan market.
More precisely, we run state-level panel regressions with a full set of state
and year fixed effects of the following form:
LOAN VOLst = β1DEREGst +β2DEREGst ×HHI 1994s(4)
+γSTATE CONTROLSs,t−1+αs +αt + εst ,
where αs and αt are state and year dummies, respectively. Note that HHI 1994s by
itself is absorbed by the state fixed effects. In some regressions, we also include
the state-level controls real GSP per capita and house price growth. LOAN VOLst
is the ratio of either aggregate syndicated loan volume or bilateral loan volume,
scaled by state GDP.28 Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Table 5 plots the results of this exercise. In columns 1–3, we start by testing
the impact of interstate branching on syndicated loan issuance, scaled over GSP.
Consistent with the time-series pattern, the interaction term DEREG×HHI 1994
in column 2 has a negative estimated coefficient of −12.948, which is highly sta-
tistically significant. This suggests that total yearly syndicated loan issuance de-
creased in states that were particularly affected by the IBBEA; this result is also
robust to including the growth in house prices and real GDP per capita as con-
trol variables (column 3). To illustrate the implied magnitudes, consider the states
TABLE 5
Branching Deregulation and State-Level Loan Issuance
Table 5 reports results from state-level regressions of syndicated and bilateral loan issuance volumes (from DealScan)
on a branching deregulation dummy, interacted with a state’s market concentration in 1994. Loan volumes are scaled by
state gross domestic product (GDP). State controls are real gross state product (GSP) growth and house price growth.
All regressions include state and year fixed effects (FE). Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by state.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Syndicated Loan Volume Bilateral Loan Volume
1 2 3 4 5 6
DEREG −0.524 1.988** 1.735* −0.027 −0.492** −0.479**
(0.652) (0.979) (0.954) (0.072) (0.201) (0.217)
DEREG × HHI_1994 −12.948*** −11.008*** 2.400*** 2.366**
(3.464) (3.263) (0.857) (0.924)
State controls Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 1,071 1,071 1,020 1,071 1,071 1,020
Adj. R 2 0.597 0.607 0.626 0.350 0.378 0.391
27Alaska is the only state that lifted any branching restriction contemporaneously with the passing
of the IBBEA in 1994.
28Note that our results are not driven by an endogenous response of state GDP to deregulation;
our results are qualitatively similar if we scale syndicated loan issuance over total C&I loans from the
FDIC.
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with the highest and lowest pre-reform concentration: South Dakota and Illinois,
with a deposit HHI of 0.353 and 0.085, respectively. Our estimates in column 2
imply that the more competitive Illinois saw an increase in the ratio of syndicated
lending to GDP by 1.988−12.948×0.085≈0.891. The syndicated loan ratio of
South Dakota, in contrast, is estimated to drop sharply, by approximately 2.58.
Comparing the least and most concentrated states around deregulation thus im-
plies a quantitatively large contraction in syndicated loan issuance/GDP of 1.48,
approximately 53% of the pre-reform average ratio of 2.85.
In columns 4–6 of Table 5, we find the opposite effect for bilateral loans.
States that had little competition before the IBBEA saw disproportionate increases
in direct lending post-deregulation. How does this lending increase compare to
the drop in syndication? Again consider Illinois and South Dakota as examples
at the opposite ends of market concentration prior to the reform. The estimates
in column 5 imply that the ratio of bilateral loan issuance to GDP increased by
−0.492+2.400×0.268≈0.152 in highly concentrated South Dakota compared
with Illinois. Because the pre-reform bilateral lending ratio stood much lower at
0.253, this suggests an increase in the credit supply of approximately 60%.
These results are consistent with the result in Rice and Strahan (2010) that
interstate branching eased credit constraints for small borrowers taking out direct
loans. At the same time, our findings suggest a relatively small overall effect on
credit volumes in percentage terms: The approximate 53% reduction in syndi-
cated volumes was only marginally offset by the 60% increase in bilateral loans.
However, these outcomes are subject to much stronger identifying assumptions
than our loan- and bank-level results and should thus be interpreted with caution.
They do, however, suggest that even at the aggregate state level, allowing banks to
build branching networks led to a reshuffling of loan portfolios from syndicated
to bilateral contracts.
Taken together with our evidence on spreads, the results suggest that allow-
ing interstate branching led to a supply-driven substitution of syndicated for bilat-
eral loan contracts.
D. Threats to Identification
Loan-Level Correlates
One concern with our loan-level results may be that our exposure variables
EXP are not randomly assigned and thus capture deregulation effects unrelated to
syndication. For example, banking-sector changes induced by the IBBEA could
have a differential effect across different types of loans, independent of the sub-
stitution hypothesis we are testing. Because our results hold with a full set of
borrower × year and bank × year fixed effects, any such effect would have to
work through an interaction of state-level deregulation with correlates of the EXP
measure.
Figure 5 investigates contract-level correlates of our exposure variables.
More precisely, we plot standardized coefficients from regressing our loan-level
control variables on the dummies for syndicated loans, commercial bank lenders,
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FIGURE 5
Cross-Sectional Correlates of Exposure Variables
Figure 5 plots the standardized estimated coefficients from regressing the loan characteristics on the left-hand side on
the exposure variables (syndicated loans, commercial bank dummy, out-of-state bank dummy) after controlling for the
vector of borrower fundamentals and year dummies. We also plot the 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard
errors clustered by borrower.
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and out-of-state commercial banks. To make loans comparable, we control for
borrower fundamentals and year dummies.29
As expected, the out-of-state bank dummy is not significantly correlated with
any characteristic. The most obvious pattern that emerges is that syndicated loans
are considerably larger than bilateral contracts and carry longer maturities, with
a slightly higher likelihood of collateralization. Consistent with the existence of
benefits to banking relationships, commercial banks do more repeat lending with
lower collateralization; their contracts are also less likely to be term loans (i.e.,
more likely to be lines of credit). What matters is that across the different ex-
posure measures, we find no systematic correlation with these other loan terms.
Taken together with our results on preexisting trends in Section IV.A, it thus seems
unlikely that unobservable loan characteristics are behind our findings.
In a further test, we access DealScan amendment files that record renegoti-
ations resulting in interest spread changes for the same loan. This allows us to
run regressions of changes in spreads for the same loan in a sample of amend-
ment events with loan-facility fixed effects, holding other loan terms constant.30
We report the results in the Supplementary Material. Despite the small number
of spread amendments, we find positive coefficients for all interacted coefficients
29The pattern is very similar without these control variables (available from the authors).
30Of course, this approach comes with another challenge: Although we “buy” the advantage of
taking out differences between facilities at issuance, amendments in spreads may coincide with other
contract changes. However, such within-contract amendments are of smaller magnitude than between-
contract differences, and we can control for these using a vector of the available variables.
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as before, although these sometimes lack statistical precision. Nevertheless, these
results are further evidence that unobserved loan-level differences are unlikely to
drive our findings.
Endogenous Borrower Composition
The most obvious explanation for observing higher spreads after deregula-
tion is an increase in borrower risk. Because our loan-level estimations include a
full set of borrower × year and bank × year fixed effects, differences in ex ante
or realized firm-level risk cannot explain the increase. A change in risk may, how-
ever, play a role by interacting with our EXP variables.
We begin to address this by either including additional controls or altering the
estimation sample. In the Supplementary Material, we show that our results also
hold when including a control for numerical credit ratings. An increase in risk may
also result from small firms expanding their market share due to better financing
terms following deregulation. Yet, controlling for a borrower’s market share in
industry sales does not alter our estimates (column 4). In column 9 of Table A5 of
the Supplementary Material, we also accommodate the concern that our findings
may have something to do with institutional investor activity in syndicated loans
by dropping all “Term Loan” and “Term Loan B” facilities. This yields a very
similar point estimate of 0.052 (still highly significant).
It is also possible that safer borrowers opted out of the syndicated loan mar-
ket after branching deregulation, which could affect the risk profile of “treated”
loans. The intuition behind this concern is developed in models such as that of
Bris and Welch (2005), where the “best firms” self-select into more concentrated
credit contracts; bilateral loans would be the most extreme example. The figure in
the Supplementary Material shows that this is not a valid concern in the aggregate:
The share of loans issued by investment-grade borrowers was approximately sta-
ble around the IBBEA, and the share of rated borrowers slightly increased. This
implies that, if anything, the quality of borrowers taking out syndicated loans in-
creased with deregulation. More importantly, we find no differential selection of
firms based on our EXP measures: Borrowers taking out “treated” loans were not
riskier after deregulation compared to before (see Table A7 of the Supplemen-
tary Material). Taken together, these results allow us to conclude that changes in
borrower risk are unlikely to drive our results.
Changes in Credit Demand
An alternative explanation for increased syndicated loan rates would be
higher credit demand. Work by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and Huang (2008),
among others, suggests that other episodes of U.S. banking deregulation have
been associated with higher economic growth rates, which may increase the de-
mand for credit. This concern is accommodated by our loan-level regressions with
borrower × year fixed effects, which hold borrower fundamentals (including de-
mand) constant. Further, in Section IV.C, we show that syndicated loan issuance
contracted after branching deregulation. At the same time, we find that bilateral
loan issuance grew post-IBBEA. The substitution between syndicated and bilat-
eral loans thus cannot be explained by a higher overall demand for credit.
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Endogenous Deregulation Timing
Another potential threat to our identification strategy is that interstate branch-
ing deregulation may be endogenous to the size of the local syndicated loan mar-
ket. Large lenders engaged in syndicated lending might have lobbied state leg-
islators to delay deregulation in order to reap rents serving their client base. A
decrease in syndicated loan activity could thus also reflect large banks lobbying
less in these states due to lower future growth opportunities. Although it is not
possible to test whether the deregulation timing is endogenous, we believe this is
not a concern in our setting for two reasons.
First, existing evidence in Kroszner and Strahan (1999) and Rice and Strahan
(2010) suggests it was smaller, not larger banks that lobbied for later interstate
branching deregulation. Jayaratne and Strahan ((1996), (1998)) further show that
states did not deregulate in anticipation of future growth prospects (which may
have affected syndicated and bilateral loans differently).
Second, we find no correlation between deregulation timing and the size of
the syndicated loan market or the degree of local market concentration before
IBBEA implementation. The results from these tests can be found in tables in the
Supplementary Material. Although only suggestive, they provide some evidence
that our results are not driven by expectations correlated with deregulation.
E. Exploring Borrower Heterogeneity
Observing higher spreads after deregulation may initially be surprising,
given the evidence in Rice and Strahan (2010) that IBBEA implementation
decreased the cost of credit for small firms. In this section, we show that dif-
ferences in sample composition are key to understanding why we find differen-
tial effects on syndicated and bilateral loans. We show that even in our sample,
smaller, riskier, and more opaque borrowers saw a decrease in loan pricing, a re-
sult in accord with Rice and Strahan (2010). An intuitive interpretation is that
lifting interstate branching restrictions considerably leveled the playing field in
the U.S. credit market by decreasing the costs of screening and monitoring these
types of borrowers (D’Acunto et al. (2017)). This is also consistent with the com-
mon finding in the literature on U.S. banking deregulation that small and opaque
firms were the main beneficiaries (see, among others, Black and Strahan (2002),
Kerr and Nanda (2009), Beck et al. (2010), and Chava et al. (2013)).
To test how differences across borrowers matter for squaring our results with
previous findings, we run regressions with an interaction term as given by equa-
tion (2), where we condition the effect of the DEREG dummy on borrower char-
acteristics. We define these characteristics in the year before a state implemented
the IBBEA because borrower fundamentals may themselves become endogenous
afterward. Specifically, we use borrower firm size (as measured by the log of total
assets), asset tangibility, and numerical credit ratings as proxies for firms’ ex ante
opaqueness. The interaction with firm-level characteristics conveniently also en-
ables us to include state × year fixed effects to absorb other potential state-level
trends.
The results for borrower heterogeneity can be found in Table 6. In column
1, we introduce the interaction term with pre-reform firm size, as measured by
the log of total assets. The interaction term DEREG× ln(ASSETS) is positive,
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TABLE 6
Differential Effects Across Borrowers
Table 6 reports the impact of interstate bank branch deregulation on the interest rates of loans in the syndicated market in
the United States. The dependent variable is the lending rate spread from contracts included in the DealScan database.
The explanatory variable is a dummy that equals 1 if a state lifts one or more branching restrictions for the first time, and
0 otherwise. See the text for included control variables. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state
level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Interaction with Pre-Reform Borrower Characteristics
ln(ASSETS) PPE RATING
1 2 3 4 5 6
DEREG −0.380*** – −0.054 – 0.218 –
(0.078) (0.043) (0.138)
DEREG × interaction variable 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.148* 0.145* −0.023** −0.037***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.078) (0.084) (0.012) (0.013)
Loan controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes – Yes – Yes –
State × year FE Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 4,407 4,323 4,403 4,319 1,861 1,754
Adj. R 2 0.823 0.862 0.821 0.861 0.858 0.907
but the DEREG dummy by itself now attracts a negative sign. The estimates sug-
gest an important heterogeneity for the impact of IBBEA implementation within
our sample: A firm in the 10th percentile of the size distribution saw a 12% de-
crease in spreads, whereas a firm in the 90th percentile saw a 17% increase.31
Smaller firms thus benefited from interstate branching deregulation even within
our sample, consistent with Rice and Strahan (2010), Acharya, Imbs, and Sturgess
(2011), and Chava et al. (2013), among others. Although large firms still pay lower
interest rates than small ones after deregulation, the differential between them nar-
rows. Including a full set of state × year dummies in column 2 makes almost no
difference to these estimates.
Other differences in borrower characteristics are also important mediators.
Interest rate increases are concentrated in firms with higher pre-reform asset tan-
gibility (as measured by fixed over total assets), with a negative (but imprecisely
estimated) effect on firms with lower tangibility. Again, moving from the 10th to
the 90th percentile, this implies a range from a 4.2% decrease (−0.054+0.148×
0.079≈−0.042) to a 4.7% increase (−0.054+0.148×0.684≈0.047). Interest
rates thus became relatively less responsive to fixed asset holdings after IBBEA
implementation. To the extent that collateral is a tool to overcome asymmetric
information between lenders and borrowers, this indicates reduced financial fric-
tions. Another important margin for banking deregulation is firm risk (Neuhann
and Saidi (2017)). The estimates in column 5 of Table 6 imply that firms with
inferior credit ratings saw lower interest rates following branching deregulation.
Going from an AAA rating (equal to 1 in our rating scale) to BB+ (equal to 11
in our rating scale) implies a sizeable difference of 20.7 log points in the effect
31We arrive at this estimate by calculating the total effect for a small firm (log assets of ≈4.082)
as −0.380+0.063×4.082≈−0.122. Equivalently, for a large firm with total (log) assets of ≈8.760,
we calculate the total effect as −0.380+0.063×8.760≈0.172.
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of branching deregulation. For safe borrowers, spreads clearly increased; risky
borrowers saw a decline in rates.
Overall, our results suggest that lifting interstate branching restrictions ben-
efited opaque borrowers, which may be more expensive to screen and monitor.
Although the average net effect on the spreads of syndicated loans in our sample
was positive (albeit small), borrowers who are particularly subject to ex ante diffi-
culties in tapping credit markets did indeed see lower rates. We find that the firms
in our sample most similar to those examined by Rice and Strahan (2010) were
the unconditional winners.
F. Additional Robustness Checks
We conduct a battery of further validity checks to assess the robustness of
our main results. One worry may be that, despite the evidence of no preexisting
trends in Section IV, our treatment variable may pick up secular state-level trends
in the spreads of particular loans unrelated to deregulation. As an alternative test,
we therefore conduct a placebo test by assuming that a state’s IBBEA implemen-
tation occurred 7 years prior to the actual deregulation year, similar to Rice and
Strahan (2010). The choice of 7 years is driven by the sample length: Our ob-
servations start in 1987, and the first state to allow interstate branching, Alaska,
implemented the IBBEA in 1994. In the Supplementary Material, we show the re-
sults of running our baseline regressions over the time period of 1987–1994. All
of the estimates for the placebo dummy are indistinguishable from 0, providing
yet more evidence that we are capturing a causal effect of branching deregulation.
Another concern may be that including borrower fixed effects leaves us with
a “biased” sample of repeat borrowers. Because the syndicated loan market is
characterized by repeated interactions between borrowers and lenders, however,
we lose less than 5% of observations by requiring at least two loan contracts in the
sample. We also show that our results hold between (instead of within) borrowers
by exchanging borrower dummies with industry and state dummies in column 2
of Table A5 of the Supplementary Material.
The loan-level regressions we employ allow us to control for other contract
determinants of spreads, such as the use of collateral. In order to alleviate con-
cerns that these are jointly determined with interest rate spreads, we omit all loan
controls in column 5 of Table A5 in the Supplementary Material. This makes
no material difference in our point estimate. Additionally, there may be a con-
cern that our panel regressions understate standard errors, despite the conservative
clustering. We address this concern by collapsing the panel into two observations
per firm, as suggested by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). We imple-
ment this by calculating the average interest rate before and after deregulation
for each firm in the full sample (weighted by loan size) and regressing it on the
post-deregulation dummy. The estimates in column 6 in Table A5 of the Sup-
plementary Material show that this simple regression yields a point estimate of
≈0.085 with a t-statistic of 6.32, suggesting that our results are unlikely to be
driven by suppressed standard errors.
As described previously, we establish our main results using the sample pe-
riod of 1987–2007, excluding the Great Recession. In the Supplementary Ma-
terial, we rerun all regressions in the full sample period available until 2012.
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The results in almost all specifications are now even more precisely estimated
with largely unchanged coefficients, suggesting that the increases in interest rates
on large loans we have documented throughout the article were not washed away
by the financial crisis of 2007–2008. We also repeat our main estimation with the
original Rice and Strahan (2010) index; column 7 in Table A5 of the Supplemen-
tary Material shows this has no substantial bearing on our result.
As a last exercise, we address the concern that large states are overrepre-
sented in our sample and thus may drive the results. We run the baseline regres-
sion in equation (1) and exclude all individual states in turn. Figure A4 of the
Supplementary Material plots the coefficient estimates of all of these regressions
and compares them to the baseline result presented in Table 2. With the exception
of a single outlier, excluding individual states makes little difference to the point
estimate. Excluding Texas leads to a substantially higher coefficient (by almost
50%). If anything, this suggests our sample composition actually understates the
IBBEA’s impact on syndicated loan spreads.
V. Conclusion
In this article, we show that the wave of state-level deregulation following the
passage of the IBBEA had substantial effects on the syndicated loan market. We
show that branching deregulation was associated with a substitution of syndicated
for bilateral lending, accompanied by a narrower interest rate differential between
(cheaper) syndicated and (more expensive) bilateral loan contracts. These findings
are consistent with the interpretation that branching networks and syndication are
partial substitutes for diversifying geographical credit risk.
The unique institutional setting of the IBBEA allows us to exploit cross-
sectional loan-level exposure to identify the causal effect of interstate branching.
In particular, we show that the substitution effect was entirely driven by out-of-
state commercial banks, the only group legally affected by the reforms. Impor-
tantly, the higher lending competition expanded credit supply by other lenders, a
result that aligns with previous evidence of Rice and Strahan (2010). We further
find that these effects vary across borrowers: Small, risky firms with few tangible
assets in particular stood to benefit from branching deregulation, even in our sam-
ple of relatively large companies. We add the nuance that this likely contributed
to a more level playing field between large and small borrowers in the U.S. credit
market.
Our findings suggest that abolishing geographic branching restrictions may
have at least partially contributed to the declining share of the United States in the
global syndicated loan market starting in the mid-1990s, as documented by Carey
and Nini (2007) and Gadanecz (2004). This implies that the effects of financial
reforms are far from uniform and may have a considerable differential impact on
the pricing and allocation of credit. A promising area of future work is to study
the consequences of other types of financial reforms and how other regulatory
changes affected the syndicated loan market.
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Appendix. Variable Definitions
Loan characteristics (DealScan)
LOAN SIZE: Facility amount in million USD.
SPREAD: Interest rate spread, usually over LIBOR, in basis points.
MATURITY: Loan maturity in months.
SECURED: Equal to 1 if loan is backed by collateral, and 0 otherwise.
RELAT: Equal to 1 if a firm received a bank from the same lead bank before, and 0
otherwise.
TERM LOAN: Equal to 1 if loan is a term loan, and 0 otherwise.
PURPOSE: Vector of dummy variables for the different loan purposes.
SYN: Equal to 1 if the loan’s distribution method is not “sole lender” (i.e., the loan is
syndicated), and 0 otherwise.
Bank characteristics (DealScan/FDIC)
COMM BANK: Equal to 1 if the creditor’s SIC code starts with 602, and 0 otherwise.
OOS BANK: Equal to 1 if a bank does not have branches in a borrower’s state prior to
deregulation, and 0 otherwise; defined only for commercial banks.
Firm characteristics (Compustat)
LEV: [Long-term debt (dltt) + debt in current liabilities (dlc)]/total assets (at).
Q: [Common shares outstanding (csho) price close− annual− calendar (prccc)+ debt
in current liabilities (dlc) + long-term debt (dltt)]/total assets (at).
ASSETS: Total assets (at).
ROA: Operating income before depreciation (oibdp)/total assets (at).
DEBT CF NEG: [Long-term debt (dltt) + debt in current liabilities (dlc)]/[operating
income before depreciation (oibdp) + depreciation and amortization (dp). Equal to 1
for negative values.
DEBT CF HIGH: [Long-term debt (dltt) + debt in current liabilities (dlc)]/[operating
income before depreciation (oibdp) + depreciation and amortization (dp). Equal to 1
for the fourth quartile.
SALE GR: Growth in sales/turnover (net) [(sale−sale(t−1))/sale(t−1)].
RAT DUM: Equal to 1 if a firm has any rating from S&P, Fitch, Moody’s, or Duffs &
Phelps.
RATING: Numerical credit rating, ranging from AAA to D.
PPE: [Property, plant and equipment (ppent)/total assets (at).
State characteristics
DEREG: Reversed deregulation index from Rice and Strahan (2010), where 0 is most
restrictive and 4 is most liberalized.
DEREG D: Set to 1 for the first year the reversed deregulation index is not 0.
SYN LOAN VOL GDP: Aggregate total volume of syndicated loans in DealScan,
scaled over state GDP (GSP).
BIL LOAN VOL GDP: Aggregate total volume of bilateral loans in DealScan, scaled
over state GDP (GSP).
HHI 1994: County-level Herfindahl index of deposits in the pre-deregulation year, ag-
gregated to the state level using county deposits as weights.
HP GROWTH: Year-on-year growth in house prices. Source: Federal Housing Finance
Agency.
GDP GROWTH: Year-on-year growth in real GSP per capita. Source: BEA.
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Supplementary Material
Supplementary Material for this article is available at https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0022109019000607.
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